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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CITES "FACTS" 
THAT ARE NOT IN THE RECORD. 
A. There Is Nothing in the Record That Suggests the Department "Participated In" Vivian's 
Presumed Marriage Settlement Agreement. 
In Respondent's Brief, the personal representative repeatedly refers to "facts" that are 
completely unsupported in the record. At pages 1 and 2, he states: 
The transmutation agreement determined the amount of spend-down required of Vivian 
before she could be eligible for Medicaid. Over the course of a year or two after the 
transmutation agreement was executed, the Department determined that Vivian had 
spent down her resources and because she had no interest in any other property, 
including Emerson's, she was granted Medicaid eligibility. 
* * * 
The Department, after providing the vehicle for transmutation, seeks to recover 
its debt from Emerson's sole and separate property. In fact, the Department 
supervised the spend-down of Vivian's only assets in order to make her eligible for 
assistance. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-2 (underline added). On page 3 the personal representative goes on to say 
that the Department describes facts "without mention of the transmutation it participated in, nor the 
spend down of Vivian's assets .... " Respondent's Brief, p. 3 (underline added). Likewise, in the first 
paragraph on page 4, the personal representative repeatedly refers to the "Department's participation" 
in the transmutation of property. Finally, on page 7, he states that the estate funds were "transmuted to 
Emerson by the Department and agents." None of these "facts" are true and they are completely 
unsupported in the record. There is no evidence the Department had any involvement, much less 
supervision, of Vivian's presumed marriage settlement agreement. 
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Similarly, on page 8 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative makes claims about 
what a witness would have, but did not, say, and then proceeds to use that unspoken "fact" to claim: 
Given the propensity to lose the written agreements, and the fact that Vivian could not 
have become eligible for benefits without one, convinced the Department that indeed 
one existed. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 8. The Department denies there is a "propensity to lose ... written 
agreements," and denies it was "convinced [a marriage settlement agreement] existed." There is 
nothing in the record to support such claims. 
B. The Magistrate's Finding That a Marriage Settlement Agreement Existed Is Not an Issue in this 
Appeal. 
The personal representative claims the Department stipulated to the existence of a marriage 
settlement agreement, but then "insisted it had not so stipulated." Respondent's Brief, p. 2. This is not 
what happened. At the start of the hearing on the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim the 
Department stipulated that Vivian had been treated as if she had a marriage settlement agreement. 
Since Vivian was made eligible in 2003, the marriage settlement agreement, if it existed, would have 
been executed about that time. This is as far as the Department was willing to stipulate. The 
Department did not stipulate that an agreement actually existed. It is just as possible that the 
Department's eligibility personnel had accepted a representation that such an agreement existed, or 
would be executed, but the agreement never existed. I 
At that point in the proceedings, the Department didn't consider it relevant whether there was a 
marriage settlement agreement or not, since it was under the impression the case of Idaho Department 
ISee email dated Monday, February 1,2010, referencing caseworker notes where the caseworker assumed 
an marriage settlement agreement existed and stated, "HOPE SO ANYWAY." R. p. 215. 
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afHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) had decided the spousal 
recovery issue. The briefmg had focused on federal preemption and the case of In re Estate of Barg, 
752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). It was a surprise to the Department that Judge Frates later found the 
existence of an MSA to be a critical issue and drew broad conclusions from the Department's 
stipulation. It was probably an error of counsel to not anticipate this issue and more narrowly tailor the 
stipulation. 
In any event, the Department has not appealed Judge Frates's findings of fact to this Court and 
what mayor may not have been intended by the stipulation is not in issue here. 
II. 
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN THE RECOVERY OF 
ASSETS EXCLUDED FOR ELIGIBILITY. 
The personal representative believes there is an "inherent contradiction" where assets are 
permitted to be transferred to the spouse for eligibility purposes, but then, after death, are subject to 
estate recovery. He states: 
There is an inherent contradiction created by the Department's participation in the 
transmutation, only to subsequently "interpret" the statutes and case law as holding that 
Emerson's separate property is subject to Medicaid recovery. Because of the 
transmutation, which occurred in 2002, the Wiggins did not seek counsel to determine 
their legal rights.2 The Department, however, simply waited until both Emerson and 
Vivian died and then came after Emerson's separate property. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 4. However, there is nothing inconsistent in this. The limited division of assets, 
which is permitted to facilitate eligibility, benefits both spouses. It allows the Medicaid spouse to 
2 Again, there is nothing in the record supporting this claim and it is incorrect. 
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receive the assistance she needs. It also allows the non-Medicaid spouse the resources necessary to 
live in the community. After the death of both spouses - after their needs have been fully met - there is 
nothing inconsistent with recovering the couple's assets to reimburse the Medicaid program so the 
needs of other needy couples may be met. Indeed, as described in section IV of Appellant's Brief 
(beginning at p. 10) this shifting treatment of the couple's assets is exactly what the law intends. 
III. 
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 SEEKS RECOVERY FROM ASSETS 
TRACEABLE TO THE MEDICAID SPOUSE WHETHER OR 
NOT THEY HAVE BECOME THE SEPARATE PROPERTY 
OF THE SPOUSE. 
A. The Department's Rules Protect Property Which Has Always Been the Spouse's Separate 
Property. 
The personal representative accuses the Department of changing its position relating to the 
spouse's separate property: 
The Department's initial position encompasses such situations as occur when 
two older folks marry, both having substantial separate property from their former 
relationships. The Department's position was such that the subject couple can do 
nothing to protect each other's separate property from Medicaid recovery. It is 
unconscionable to think that folks who get married the second or third time around, 
presumably in their later years, would lose their separate property to Medicaid 
recovery provided to a spouse. The statute as applied in the manner originally 
demanded by the Department, is overbroad and unconstitutional. State v Bitt, 118 
Idaho 584 (1990). 
* * * 
The Department in its Appellant's Brief now claims that its recovery can be 
limited to "once community property", thus shielding the second marriage example 
above from its reach. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11. However, it has always been the Department's position that recovery 
is made by tracing the property of the Medicaid spouse, including what had been community property 
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and other jointly owned assets. See Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance, pp. 3-4 (R. 
pp. 29-30); Appellant's Brief (District Court, Sept. 17,2010), p. 6 (R. p. 274); Appellant's Reply 
Brief (District Court, Nov. 5,2010), p. 8 (R. p. 359); Tr. (Feb. 8,2011) p. 12,1. 6 to p, 13,1. 25. 
This position was made clearly in the Appellant's Reply Brief (Nov. 5,2010) in the District 
Court, in which the Department stated: 
Contrary to the assertions of the personal representative, the Department does not 
recover from property which has always been the separate property of the 
non-Medicaid spouse. When a couple marries late in life, bringing their separate 
property with them, they are not obligated for the Medicaid debt of the spouse, from 
property which they retain as their separate property. That is what IDAP A 
16.03.09.900.203 does, it limits the Department's recovery to property which had been 
the couple's community property, or the property of the Medicaid recipient. 
Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court, Nov. 5, 2010), p. 8 (R. p. 359). Contrary to the argument of 
the personal representative, the Department has never sought to recover property that was not 
traceable to the Medicaid recipient.4 
B. The Legislative History Cited by the Personal Representative Is Not Inconsistent with the 
Department's Rules and Practice. 
At page 10 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative argues that the legislative history 
ofIdaho Code § 56-218 shows an intent that recovery be made only from property that was still 
community property at the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. The relevant part of the Statement of 
Purpose he cites states: 
3Now found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01. 
4In this case, the personal representative has admitted that the estate funds are traceable to the couple's 
community property. At page 7 of Respondent's Briefhe states, "In fact, the funds still in existence are the funds 
transmuted to Emerson .... " 
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The proposed legislation also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218 to 
clarify that the non-Medicaid spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive the 
Medicaid recipient in order for the department to file a claim against the community 
property of the non-Medicaid spouse's estate. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 13525 (2004 Legislature). The legislation the statement of purpose refers to 
is S.B. 1290, passed in 2004 (Idaho Session Laws 2004, ch. 216, § 1, p. 650) which added the 
discovery exception to the asset transfer provision ofIdaho Code § 56-218. The technical correction 
referred to is the following change to the then existing Idaho Code § 56-218(1): 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five 
(55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the Stl1 vi v ing spouse, if any, for 
such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate of either 
spouse, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the 
St11 viving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child 
who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers ofreal or personal property, on or 
after the look-back dates defmed in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or 
their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an 
action in the district court. 
Idaho Session Laws 2004, ch. 216, § 1, p. 650. In other words, the spousal recovery language was 
already present (and indeed had been present since the original version was passed in 1988). The 
"technical correction" related to the order of death of the spouses, not what property could be 
recovered from the estate of the spouse. 
This statutory change dealt with circumstances where the non-Medicaid spouse passed away 
first, and the Medicaid spouse survived him. Therefore, the focus was on the recovery of the property 
of the non-Medicaid spouse. Recovery would only be made from his assets that had been community 
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property, not his assets that had always been his separate property. IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01. 
According to the Legislative Services Office, a Statement of Purpose "is a brief explanation, in lay 
terms, of what a bill would do or what changes a bill would make to existing law." A Drafting Guide 
for Statements of Purpose and Fiscal Notes ~ 1 
(http://legislature.idaho.gov/aboutisopdraftingguide.htm). Accordingly, the statement should not be read 
as a technical legal statement. It is consistent to read this statement as referring to property that had 
been the couple's community property. The reference to the non-Medicaid spouse's community 
property was "a brief explanation, in lay terms" to refer to the couple's jointly owned property, as 
distinguished from property that had always been his separate property. If there is any ambiguity in the 
law as it relates to separate and community property, the Department's longstanding rules currently 
found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01 and .05 are a much better guide to the intended meaning of the 
statute than the "lay terms" statement of purpose. 
C. No Further Definition of the Estate of the Spouse Is Needed. 
The personal representative believes a "glaring problem with Idaho Code § 56-218(1) is its 
failure to defme the "estate of the spouse." Respondent's Brief, p. 9 (emphasis in original). 
However, there doesn't seem any question that Emerson is "the spouse" and the probate code defines 
"estate:" 
(16) "Estate" means all property of the decedent, inel uding community 
property of the surviving spouse subject to administration, property of trusts, and 
property of any other person whose affairs are subject to this code as it exists from time 
to time during administration. 
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Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16). This defInition seems very clear. There is no question that the assets 
sought here were within Emerson's estate. Indeed, the Inventory fIled by the personal representative 
states as much. R. pp. 22-4. 
D. If There Is an Absurd Result. it Arises from the Personal Representative's Interpretation of the 
Statute. 
At page 14 of Respondent's Brief the personal representative notes the common rule applied to 
the interpretation of ambiguous statutes: "a reviewing court shall not interpret a statute in a manner that 
leads to an absurd result." (Citing State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 535, 224 P.3d 1109, 1124 
(2010)). However, the personal representative both contends the "statute is clear and unambiguous" 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 15) and does not explain what part of the interpretation suggested by the 
Department is absurd. On the other hand, interpreting the federal law as demanded by the personal 
representative has perverse consequences. For example, Medicaid payments intended to ease the 
burden on elderly couples become, instead, a windfall to their heirs. Unmarried Medicaid recipients are 
placed at a disadvantage to married couples because a married Medicaid recipient may pass her 
property to her heirs while an unmarried Medicaid recipient's assets must be used to repay Medicaid. 
Unsophisticated couples who do not seek legal advice will leave nothing to their heirs, while those who 
consult an attorney will convey their assets to the non-Medicaid spouse and entirely avoid recovery. 
The arbitrary order of death may determine whether recovery is made or not.s In view of the purpose 
of Congress to trace assets, whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes, as explained by the House 
SPor example, in this case Emerson died less than two weeks after Vivian. If the order of their deaths were 
reversed, there would be little controversy over the Department's recovery since the probate allowances (Idaho 
Code § 15-2-401 to 406) and Vivian's intestate share (Idaho Code § 15-2-102) would consume almost all the estate 
assets. 
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Budget Committee in Section 5112 ofH.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,1993) 
(quoted at p. 12 of Appellant's Brief), to read the law the way the personal representative demands 
could be called "absurd." 
IV. 
EACH COURT THAT HAS CONSIDERED THE 
DEFINITION OF ASSETS IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1), HAS 
FOUND THE RECOVERY SOUGHT HERE AUTHORIZED 
BY FEDERAL LAW. 
A. The Barg Case Is Not Controlling Here. 
The personal representative cites Estate ojBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) and suggests 
that Idaho Department ojHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) 
would have been decided differently had the court had the benefit of the Barg decision. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 15. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Barg case did not discuss the definition of 
"assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, which was central to this court's discussion in Jackman. 
In the Jackman case, the court upheld recovery from the estate ofthe non-Medicaid spouse. 
Except for the dates, the facts in Jackman are nearly identical to those here. In Jackman the Medicaid 
spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her spouse, Lionel, by a marriage settlement agreement. 
Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal 
representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal 
representative challenged the Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal preemption. 
The court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate, together 
REPL Y BRIEF - 9 Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\Reply Briefwpd 
with the definition of assets found at 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1 )6, validated recovery of property that 
had, at any time after October 1, 1993, been community property. 
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because ofthe way it was decided. The final 
decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, ofthe original decision of the court. It is helpful to 
understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on rehearing. In the court's 
first decision, the Court held wholly in favor of the Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the 
Supreme Court modified its decision because the effective date of the federal law on which the Court 
had relied in its original opinion was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The 
court, therefore, held that recovery would be limited to property that had been community property 
after the effective date ofthe federal law, "OBRA '93."7 
The Magistrate seemed to believe that Jackman held that only property which remains 
community property at death is subject to recovery. This is incorrect. If the Magistrate were correct, 
the Supreme Court's entire discussion ofOBRA '93 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. 103-66) and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 
1396p(h)), and the expanded definition of estate, would all be superfluous. The Court could just as 
well have said, "since there was a marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred 
before death, there can be no recovery." That is not what the Court did. The discussion of the 
effective date ofOBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an important case 
6Then 42 U.s.C. § 1396p(e)(l). 
7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been 
community property at any time after October 1, 1993. 
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because it demonstrates what Congress did in enacting OBRA '93, and how the outcome of the case 
would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93, as it was in this 
case. 
The court began with the over-arching holding: 
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed at times applicable to 
this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's 
estate. We agree. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8, 970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department was 
preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband before the 
effective date ofOBRA '93. If the Court had believed there could be no recovery of property 
transferred before death, it could have simply said that such transferred property was out of the 
Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective date of 
OBRA '93 and the effect that date had on its holding. The court discussed the expanded defmition of 
estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal defmition of "assets." There was no 
controversy over the legal effect of the federal definition of "assets." Rather, the court merely 
concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the effective date of 
OBRA '93, the new federal law did not apply to the transferred property: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the agreement, 
which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993. The definition 
of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal statute does not apply 
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it does not apply to the 
agreement and does not allow the Department to recover the balance of the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)( 4), which applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters 
beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the Department to recover 
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the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the definition of "assets" 
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included 
within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate 
property, including the community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of 
Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary 
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1), 'other assets'" 
would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through the marriage 
settlement agreement. Things that are necessarily implied can have legal effect. There can be implied 
consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007)), implied authority 
(Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009)), 
and implied promises (Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387,210 P.3d 63, 72 
(2009)) among other things. There is no need to guess at the meaning ofthe Court here. The Court 
was clearly explaining the effect of OBRA '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho. 
Assuming, as we must, that there was a marriage settlement agreement in this case it would 
have been post-OBRA '93. Therefore, under Jackman the property of Emerson's estate is subject to 
estate recovery. 
The same reasoning was used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of Wirtz, 
607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000), which cites Jackman: 
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and personal 
property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other arrangement." 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income 
REPLY BRlEF - 12 Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsVlSupreme Court\Reply Briefwpd 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but 
does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal authority to 
act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of on 
or before August 10, 1993). 
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal property, and 
other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his death, 
including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement." 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to 
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and concluded: 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative 
intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical assistance and 
recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies. 
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before 
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's 
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever held 
by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate of Jobe, 590 N.W.2d 162, 166 
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which the 
deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that 
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased 
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added). 
The one other court to actually consider the effect of the definition of assets in 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(h)(1) was a federal district court in New Jersey. In the case of Johnson v. Guhl, 166 
F.Supp.2d 42 (D. New Jersey, 2001) the court considered so-called community spouse annuity trusts 
and analogized to recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse: 
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Despite the fact that there is no federal law on point with respect to CSATs 
similar to the ones at issue here, there are federal provisions that govern the recovery 
by the state of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a beneficiary. Section 13 96p(b)(1) 
allows the states to seek recovery for medical assistance properly paid under a state 
plan from the recipient's estate. See id. Section (b)(4) goes on to defme a deceased 
individual's "estate" for the purposes of this subsection as follows: 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). Further, section 1936p(e) defines "assets" with respect to 
an individual as "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's 
spouse." The corresponding state statutes and regulations essentially mimic the federal 
statutes. See N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(1); N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(3); N.J.A.C. 10:71-4. 
10(b)(3). Consequently, the federal Medicaid statutory scheme allows for the recovery 
of assets from the individual or individual spouses estate. This reading is consistent with 
the MCCA, which governs the calculation of a couples resources in order to determine 
Medicaid eligibility. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5 et seq. 
Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F.Supp.2d at 50 (underline added). Therefore, each court which has actually 
considered the definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p has uniformly upheld recovery from 
the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse. Barg, which fails to even consider the definition of "assets" in 
section 1396p, is neither helpful nor controlling here. 
B. The Case of Estate of Bruce, Cited by the Personal Representative, Does Not Support the 
Personal Representative's Position. 
At page 16 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites the case of In re Estate of 
Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.App. 2008) and states: 
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Barg was quoted in a Missouri case, In re the Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W. 3rd 
398 (Mo. App. 2008) in which an award in favor of the State of Missouri was reversed 
where tenancy in entirety was involved. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. However, Bruce was decided before the Barg case discussed here. The 
Barg case cited in Bruce was the Minnesota Court of Appeals case, In re Estate of Barg, 722 
N.W.2d 492 (Minn.App. 2006), which held in favor of spousal recovery and was cited by the dissent. 
Moreover, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Bruce made it quite clear that it only denied spousal 
recovery in that case because Missouri had not yet adopted the expanded definition of estate in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B): 
Nor could the State recover from Orville Bruce's estate because the General Assembly 
has not taken the step required by Section 13 96p(b)( 4)B to adopt a defmition of estate 
for the purpose of Medicaid recovery to include such property. For example, the New 
Jersey legislature, unlike Missouri, has adopted a definition of estate that includes: 
[A]ll real and personal property and other assets included in the recipient's 
estate as defined in N.J.S. 3B:l-l, as well as any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the recipient had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death, to the extent of that interest, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir or assign of the recipient through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
NJ.Rev.Stat. Section 30:4D-7.2a(3) (1995). Until the General Assembly takes this 
step, Missouri's Medicaid program will not be able to recover property possessed by a 
successor by virtue of being owned as a tenant by the entirety. 
Estate of Bruce, 260 S. W.3d at 403-4 (footnote omitted; underline added). Clearly, Idaho has 
already done what the court in Estate of Bruce said was necessary to authorize recovery from the 
estate of the spouse. 8 
8The dissent in Estate of Bruce agreed that adoption of the expanded definition of estate would authorize 
Missouri to recover from the spouse's estate, but believed Missouri law was already sufficiently broad to 
encompass that expanded definition. In re Estate of Bruce, 260 S. W.3d 398, 406-17 (Mo.App. 2008). The dissenting 
opinion contains a very good history of spousal recovery under the federal Medicaid law. 
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C. The Anti-lien Provision of Section 1396p Doesn't Apply after Death. 
At page 15 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative cites State Dept. of Health and 
Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P.3d 905 (2008) suggesting that the anti-lien provision of 
section 1396p militates against recovery here. However, the anti-lien provision clearly applies only 
before the death of the Medicaid recipient: 
(a) Imposition of lien against property of an individual on account of medical 
assistance rendered to him under a State plan 
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his 
death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State 
plan .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a) (underline added). This is a further example of how the rules applying to a 
Medicaid recipient's property change after death. 
D. The Expanded Definition of Estate Is Not Limited to Automatic Transfers. 
At page 21 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative contends that the expanded 
definition of estate allows recovery only of property that transfers automatically on death. This 
distinction, however, is not found anywhere in the law. Even among the listed transfers, not all occur at 
the moment of death. For example, when a living trust is created the legal title is passed immediately. 
Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443,885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary 
holds only the beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. 
Section (b)( 4) is written in very broad and expansive terms: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State pro bate law; and 
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(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death 
(to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
When this language is read in context with the remainder of the subsection and the definition of 
"assets" in subsection (h), it becomes clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth 
of this section. In case the drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement." 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such 
as that at issue in this case. In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). 
v. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT. 
The court reviews the denial of attorney fees below for an abuse of discretion. City 0/ Osburn 
v. Randel, _ Idaho _, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of 
attorney fees. 
A. The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. 
Even if the Court were to fmd in favor of the personal representative in this matter, attorney fees 
should not be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. As stated by this Court in Ralph Naylor Farms, 
LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809,172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007), "if an agency's actions are 
based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees 
should not be awarded." The Department's interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56-218 and 42 U.S.C. § 
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1396p is entirely reasonable. Moreover, where the issue is a matter of frrst impression, or other states 
have conflicting case-law, attorney fees should not be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. Smith v. 
Idaho Dept. a/Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 76,218 P.3d 1133,1137 (2009). If Jackman does not decide 
this issue, then it is one offrrst impression, and the North Dakota Supreme Court, in Wirtz, supports the 
Department's position herein. 
The personal representative seizes on certain language in Judge Frates's Memorandum 
Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate where the Magistrate stated: 
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not 
an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(B). Another 
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments 
expansive interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable. 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6 (R. p. 121). The personal 
representative contends that the use of the words "not reasonable" means that attorney fees must be 
awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117. The fact that the Magistrate said the "interpretation" was not 
reasonable does not mean the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The 
Magistrate explained: 
Now, with regard to the claim under Idaho 12-117 and Mr. Masingill again 
honed in on the section on the Department's expansive Interpretation to include all 
transactions is not reasonable. 
Although the Court found that that expansive interpretation was not reasonable, 
I don't find that the department's position was unreasonable. I fmd that the definition 
that they tried to apply was so expansive that it rendered - it rendered the community 
property law as the separate property laws of Idaho marriage settlement agreement 
provisions meaningless effectively but I'm going to reserve that issue. 
Tr. (April 21, 2010) p. 31, 11. 12-23 (quoted in R. p. 383) (underline added). In his Order on 
Attorney Fees, filed June 23,2010 (R. p. 256), the Magistrate further explained: 
REPLY BRIEF - 18 Z:IMRCases\EstateIWCCIWCC Open CaseslWigginsV\Supreme CourtlReply Briefwpd 
The legal basis for the Department's claim was based on an interpretation of an 
ambiguous and conflicting set of federal and state laws. This court determined in its 
memorandum decision that the interpretation of the law expanding collection from a 
spouses separate property to be in contravention of Idaho's community property law 
and "was not reasonable". Perhaps the appropriate term should have been "too 
expansive" since that interpretation would render Marital Settlement Agreements 
recognized by Idaho to be meaningless. The law on this matter is not settled and each 
party had a basis to make its arguments. The actions and arguments by the Department 
are neither arbitrary nor groundless. The court simply chose the less expansive 
interpretation of the law. 
Order on Attorney Fees, p. 4 (R. p. 259) (underline added). Therefore, the fact that the magistrate 
used the word "unreasonable" does not mean he was required to award attorney fees. 
B. The Personal Representative Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
The personal representative claims he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121 "because of the frivolous and unreasonable actions and positions taken by the Department." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 24. The Department has acted reasonably and in good faith in every sense in 
this matter.9 However, perhaps more correctly, Idaho Code § 12-121 simply does not apply in this 
case. As stated in Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 
P.3d 1277 (2010): 
The School District also requests attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, which 
permits fee awards to prevailing parties in "any civil action." This request is denied 
because LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities 
to which it applies. See Westway Canst., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 
107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) (citing State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 
9In support of his claim that the Department has acted frivolously, the personal representative again, and 
disingenuously, advances the claim the Department somehow failed to notify the court of the decision in the Perry 
case. Respondent's Brief, p. 25. This same argument was made to the Magistrate (R. p. 130), and again to the 
District Court (R. p. 319). The personal representative, knows, or should know by now, that the Magistrate was 
advised of the Perry decision before the Department's counsel even knew of it. See recitation off acts at R. p. 180, 
showing that the personal representative had already advised the Magistrate of the decision in Perry before the 
Department was even notified. 
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Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997» (stating that § 12-117 is the 
exclusive basis for seeking attorney fees against a state agency). 
Potlatch Educ. Ass'n, 148 Idaho at 635,226 P.3d at 1282 (underline added); accord Smith v. 
Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392,247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010). Attorney fees can not 
be awarded against the Department under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code § 56-218 permits the recovery of the assets of this joint estate whether they are 
characterized as community or separate property. The Department's claim should be allowed. 
Even if the personal representative should prevail herein, there is no abuse of discretion in the 
denial of attorney fees below and no attorney fees should be awarded on appeal. 
DATED this l ~ day of July, 2012, 
W.'dgR£Y CARTWRHfHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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